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calculators have the relevant arithmetical beliefs. The difficulty 
with this line is that the case of simple attentive miscalculation 
may be one in which the simple attentive miscalculator explicitly 
says: 'next, 2 and 3 is 6'. The words may not be produced 
mechanically or automatically, in the way in which one might 
unthinkingly repeat a poem that he has memorized. Something 
about the miscalculator's belief state seems to be relevant to the 
explanation of the miscalculation. This would seem to make a 
simple miscalculation quite unlike a subact of a skilled knowing- 
how to do something which has misfired, or of a habit which has 
not been fully inculcated or developed. 
I know that simple attentive miscalculation occurs, but I do not 
know how it is possible that it occurs. The explanation of an un- 
intentional simple attentive miscalculation must include some 
belief, but there is no plausible candidate belief which one can 
attribute to the miscalculator that will explain that miscalculation.' 
The London Schoolof Economics, 
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
' I wish t o  thank Si~non Ruben (above all), K.M. Sainsbury, Paul Noordhof, 
IIYAIIY wlto attended a semi~tar at tile I,o~tdon School of E c o ~ t o ~ ~ ~ i c s  at wlticlt this 
paper was read, Peter Smith, and an anonymous referee for Analysis for their hekp 
in writing this paper. 
A PRESENTATION WITHOUT AN EXAMPLE? 
IN A DREAM someone said to me, 'Any general thesis which is put forward without a concrete example is therein badly pre- 
sented'. That was all he said, and I was about to point out the 
irony that in merely putting forward this thesis by means of a 
general statement the speaker had failed his own requirement of 
providing an example when it suddenly occurred to me, as I 
exclaimed to him, 'Ah, I see. Your putting forward this thesis with- 
out an example is itself the concrete example'. But when I awoke I 
realized there was a problem here. If indeed the speaker is 
credited with having given me a concrete example of an example- 
less bad presentation, then that credit must be immediately with- 
drawn, because what he has given me is not an example of an 
example-less bad presentation. But if it is not an example, then it 
must once again be received as an example of example-less 
presentation, but then it once again is not an example, and so on 
forever. 
191 A PRESENTATION WITHOUT AN EXAMPLE? 
This is another paradox of inclusion, like Russell's paradox. 
What I think may make this one especially interesting is that it 
could turn out to be resistant to certain popular treatments of 
such paradoxes. This paradox arises involving natural predicates 
in a natural expression of a natural - if somewhat exaggerated -
thesis.' 
University College London, 
Gower Street, London WClE 6RT 
I I aln happy to thank Jerry Valberg, Jo WolK Malcolm Budd and G. A. Cohen 
for their advice and encouiagenlent. 
I FALSELY RELIEVE THAT P 
'You have known me for years', explained Gonzales, 'But there is 
something you have not discovered. You know me under two 
guises, just as Lois Lane knows Superman. You do not realize that 
I am the person you know under another guise. On that way of 
thinking about me, you have quite different opinions of me. In 
fact, you think me an idiot.' 
'Knowing your cleverness', I replied, 'I must with some embar- 
rassment accept what you say. Since I do not know what guise you 
mean, I do not know which belief to revise. Until I find out, it 
seems, I falsely believe that you are an idiot!' 
C m 1 1  University, 
Ithaca, NY 14853,USA 
A NOTE ON LEWIS'S ONTOLOGY 
ACCORDING TO LEWIS, possible worlds are the same kind of object as the actual world. For Lewis, possible worlds are 
concrete, spatio-temporally extended entities, containing causally 
efficacious objects (see Lewis [I], pp. 84-91 and Lewis [2] for 
details). 
One obvious criticism of this theory of possible worlds is that it 
is ontologically unparsimonious: the plurality of distinct possible 
worlds Lewis needs to represent every possible way the world 
could have been is a large plurality indeed. 
